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Britain’s first war against Revolutionary France (1793-1802) was associated with a series of 
financial panics and runs on banks in Britain. The Bank of England’s reserves suffered a significant 
drain from 1795. In Monday 27th February 1797 the Bank of England suspended convertibility of its 
notes into gold. This decision had Pitt’s agreement and was later also confirmed by the Bank Re-
striction Act, passed by Parliament on May 3rd, 1797.2 While initially announced that it was to last 
one year, it was later decided to extend it until a definite peace had been signed.3 The decision was a 
success. It saved the Bank from insolvency, inflation stayed at moderate levels, there was no effect on 
the long-term (consol) interest rate, and despite Bank of England notes becoming more common as a 
means of payment, their discount remained moderate as well. No major financial crisis resulted.4 In 
the words of Schumpeter (1987/1954, p. 690-1): “In spite of the suspension … war finance did not 
produce any great effects upon prices and foreign exchange-rates until about 1800. To the modern 
student who is inured to stronger stuff, the most striking feature of the subsequent inflation is its 
mildness … at no time was the government driven to do anything more unorthodox than abnormal-
ly heavy borrowing from the Bank, and even this borrowing never surpassed the limits beyond 
which the term ‘borrowing’ becomes an euphemism for printing government fiat”.5 
 
Why did the Restriction possible, and why did it succeed? The current historical consensus is 
that the Restriction occurred as a response to short-term pressures: the state’s need to finance the 
war, France’s remonetisation following the end of the assignats monetary regime, a loss of confidence 
in the country banks, and the run on the Bank of England’s reserves (Feaveryear 1931, p. 173; Rob-
erds and Velde 2016, p. 471, Chadha and Newby 2013, p. 5). We argue that these factors help us un-
derstand the timing of the Restriction period, but not its success. Why did people trust the Bank’s 
inconvertible notes?6 In this paper we deploy new long-term data which leads us to a complementary 
explanation: the Restriction Period succeeded thanks to the reputation of the Bank of England, 
                                                            
2 The possibility of suspension was being discussed by Pitt, the Bank, and other bankers and merchants since Janu-
ary 1797 (Clapham 2008a, p. 271). Once the news of a French landing in Wales reached London on the 25th of Febru-
ary, the Privy Council, which met the following day, decided to suspend convertibility, a decision communicated to the 
Bank of England late that night. For a recent account of these events, see Chadha and Newby (2013, pp. 5-7). 
3 As it were, the policy lasted until 1821. Peel’s resumption bill was passed in 1819; actual resumption of specie pay-
ments by the Bank of England took place in 1821. 
4 The South American bubble, which bursted in 1810 leading to a commercial crisis (and to the hostile Bullion Re-
port of 1810 which was hostile to the Bank), had in fact not been stimulated by the Bank (Clapham 2008b, p. 20). 
5 We take our title from a contemporary cartoon by a critic, James Gillray, which depicts the Bank of England as an 
old lady covered in £1 and £2 banknotes (which were being issued for the first time in 1797), complaining that the 
Prime Minister Pitt was endangering her reputation to pay for his debts (see Figure A1 in our appendix). 
6 A similar attempt to create an analogous bank for the Netherlands – the Bank of Amsterdam did not issue notes, lend to 
the government, or operate a discount window – failed, as the public did not consider the banknotes credible (Hart et al 
1997, p. 96). 
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achieved through a century of prudent behavior. The Restriction also led to a long-term unintended 
consequence in the form of a permanent shift to a paper money regime, which continued after the full 
restauration of convertibility at the inauguration of the classical gold standard regime in 1821. 
 
To make our case, we document quantitatively, for the first time, the timing of the expansion 
of paper money relative to coin supply in England during the eighteenth century, with a particular 
focus on the run-up to the Restriction Period, which we identify as encompassing a regime shift. We 
analyze the process through which the Bank of England accumulated a credible reputation over time, 
and the checks and balances that allowed for its increasing role as manager of the public debt work, 
as well as the way in which bankers in London and in the provinces reacted to specific events and 
policy measures. Before the 1790s the Bank did not expand its money supply in tandem with warfare, 
in contrast to what happened with taxes or the size of government. But as a response to the extraor-
dinary threat of the French revolution and subsequent overseas events, from 1789 to 1821 per capita 
M2 increased from £5 to £8 in real terms, while per capita coin supply fell from £4 to £3 over the 
same period (Palma 2016). Upon suspension of convertibility by the Bank in 1797 the market did not 
crash, financing continued at a renewed pace, and businessmen as well as the general public trusted 
the newly issued banknotes, which for the first time became common as a means of payment. The 
events of the last decade of the eighteenth century lead to a regime shift in the form of a decisive 
move towards an increased public role of the Bank, and once warfare was over, the increased liquidity 
stayed in the financial system, despite the full restoration of convertibility in 1821. 
 
A study of the history of the Bank is complementary to our understanding of the building-up 
of the government’s reputation, a matter which has received a great deal of attention in the economic 
history literature. But while Bordo and White (1991) focus on the credibility of the public finances of 
the British State, our focus here is on the credibility of the outstanding liabilities of one particular 
institution, the Bank of England. We hence argue that the credible commitment underpinning the 
success of British public finance consisted of two parts: the government's commitment to sound pub-
lic finance, and the Bank's commitment to sustaining both public and private credit. In this paper we 
focus on the latter, and in particular on the matter of how by the late eighteenth century the Bank 
managed to implement a set of monetary policies that were highly unconventional by the standards 
of the time, with a good measure of success.  
 
According to some authors, the Suspension was an inflationary policy geared towards in-
creasing the government’s seigniorage revenues (Bordo and Kydland 1995, Bordo and Redish 
1993). However, while it is true that the government did take advantage of the liquidity provided 
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by the Bank, most of the profits from issuing paper money went to the Bank’s shareholders, not 
to the government.7 Others argue that increasing private profits was the point of the suspension 
(Ricardo 1951/1811). By contrast, Chadha and Newby (2013), argue that through the Restriction 
the Bank of England was able to reach a closer alignment of the duration of its liabilities and 
assets, as well as providing some war finance to the government “by allowing some leverage in 
its loans relative to its market value” (p. 3). Our interpretation is closer to this viewpoint, but 
while Chadha and Newby (2013) focus exclusively on the period after 1793, we argue that under-
standing the success of the Restriction Period requires thinking about the public’s trust, which 
implies taking a longer-term view.  
 
While the reputation of the state and the Bank of England were separate, they cannot be said 
to have been independent. On the one hand, the Bank of England lent considerable amounts to the 
government8, and assisted in the formation of an effective fiscal-naval state in Britain, while at the 
same time promoting the development of a system of financial intermediation for the economy as a 
whole (O’Brien and Palma 2016). But on the other hand the state’s high fiscal capacity, constrained 
by Parliamentary oversight, meant it could borrow and had sufficient revenue to pay the loans to the 
Bank, while committing not to monetize the debt beyond certain limits.9  
 
2. Historical background 
 
2.1. The monetary system and the money supply, 1694-1821 
 
Between 1694 and 1821, the national supply of money and credit consisted of gold, silver and 
copper coins, privately issued tokens, bills of exchange, and the liabilities of banks, including notes of 
the Bank of England, notes of private country banks of issue and bankers’ deposits. Bills of exchange 
in the hands of businessmen may have been an important component of the nation's money supply in 
certain parts of the country (Ashton 1953). Bank deposits were not generally employed as a means of 
payment in the provinces, and even if within the capital cheques and drafts upon bankers could at 
times have exceeded the value of Bank of England notes in circulation, this was certainly not the case 
elsewhere. Until surprisingly late it was coin that dominated the money supply (Table 1).
                                                            
7 Roberds and Velde (2016, p. 471) write that “seigniorage [did not] play much of a role in government finance, 
since a large part of it accrued to the bank’s shareholders as profit’. 
8 Barro (1987) finds that government purchases increased significantly during the Restriction.  
9 During the suspension period, the Bank’s notes were to a large extent (though not exclusively) the counterpart to 
public securities held by the Bank. So the Treasury’s reputation as a good debtor certainly mattered for the Bank’s 
credibility, since the credibility of the Bank’s notes (which were an important component of the Bank’s liabilities), 
indirectly depended on the securities that backed them. 
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Table 1. Estimates for various components of English nominal money supply. Unit: millions of £. Sources: 
Mayhew (2013), Capie (2004) and Cameron (1967). The category “other means of payment” includes Camer-
on’s £ 6m in government tallies and £2 m in inland bills in 1688 and £3.1m in deposits in private banks in 
1750. 
 
While much of the development of the English financial system during the eighteenth centu-
ry can be represented as catching up with best practices on the continent (Coffman et al 2013), after 
almost a century of growth of financial intermediation under the auspices of the Bank of England, by 
the outbreak of the French Revolution a number of goldsmiths had turned into proper banks (Temin 
and Voth 2006), and the scale, density and spread of provincial banks had already reached a level 
where the British economy conducted a non-negligible share of its wholesale transactions with bank 
notes10, deposits11 and other forms of paper credit (negotiable bills of exchange).12 The latter were 
convertible with greater ease than anywhere outside the Netherlands into the liabilities of specialized 
institutions for the funding of trade, agriculture and industry, as well as the state (Ashton 1953). But 
their circulation at the retail and wage-paying levels nevertheless remained limited, and it was only 
with the Bank restriction act of 1797 that non-coined money really took off (Figure 1). 
                                                            
10 Nonetheless, at least prior to the Restriction, circulation of country banknotes was “far below that of the Bank” 
(Clapham 1944, p. 265) 
11 The practice of deposit banking was more advanced in eighteenth century Britain than in contemporary Amster-
dam (Jonker 1996, p. 233-6, Quinn and Roberds 2014, p. 12). 
12 In the Netherlands, money of account was additionally used to record credit granted to counterparts (Gelderblom 
and Jonker 2015), but it remains to be determined if these practices were used in Britain. Nevertheless, “From the 
1770s, private banks started to formalize ways of clearing inter-bank payments, resulting from customer transac-
tions, and used Bank notes to settle amounts outstanding between themselves” (Hotson 2012, p. 12). 
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Figure 1. British per capita coin supply (lower line) and M2 (higher line), at constant prices of 1700. The area 
in grey can be interpreted as the approximate size of non-coin money in circulation or held as store of value. 
Some important periods of warfare are marked out. Sources: this figure is derived using the indirect method 
described in Palma (2016), which in terms of data relies on Broadberry et al (2015), Capie (2004) and Mayhew 
(2013). 
 
2.2. The Bank of England and the money market 
 
 
London banks obtained their reserves from several sources including the deposits of cli-
ents (largely landowners and merchants), handling public funds en route to or from the Excheq-
uer, deposits from country bankers and finally credit extended from the Bank of England itself 
(Joslin 1954, p. 167, 176-7). Before 1797, the Bank did not permit London banks to rediscount 
bills of exchange, but this regulation could easily be circumvented by arrangements between the 
London bankers and one of the Bank of England's mercantile clients. But London banks could 
open drawing accounts at the Bank and borrow money in that way, and in 1793 just under half of 
them kept balances at the Bank (Clapham 2008a). As long as alternative ways existed for London 
bankers to obtain Bank notes and specie, direct and immediate control over their reserves could 
not be exercised by the Bank. Nevertheless, since the Directors determined the level of Bank 
notes and deposits in circulation, by expanding or contracting the Bank's credit they could ulti-
mately affect the reserves of London Bankers. 
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for gold or silver, as advances to individuals or firms, by discounting bills for the Government 
and by discounts for the private sector (Clapham 2008a, pp. 169, 172 and 204-5; Clapham 1941, 
pp. 83-4). The exchange of Bank notes for gold did not add to the supply of reserve currency 
since gold already took that form, but advances and discounts for either the private or the public 
sector certainly did. The Bank followed normal banking practice and matched liabilities with 
assets and its accounts for the years 1789-91 show that about half of its liabilities were backed by 
public securities, 41 per cent by bullion, and the remainder by private assets. If the portion of 
notes and deposits backed by bullion is excluded from view and attention is focused on the mone-
tisation of private and public assets, it then appears that some 80 per cent of the Bank's outstand-
ing liabilities in the years immediately before the war were incurred in the form of loans afforded 
to the state. This picture changed radically during the war years when the amount of reserves in 
the form of bullion held at the Bank fell sharply and discounts for the private sector became a 
more important proportion of total assets.13 
Nevertheless, the point to stress is that the creation of reserve money by the Bank of 
England originated as a response to requests for loans. By refusing to meet either Government 
or private demands the Bank could effectively curtail the supply of reserve money upon which 
London and indirectly provincial bankers conducted their operations and expanded credit.  
When the Treasury offered a larger amount of public securities (bills as well as bonds) directly to 
the money market (and the Bank of England concurrently failed to increase its discounts and 
advances to the private sector), bankers found themselves confronted with higher levels of de-
mand for loans and credit. Unless they lowered the ratio of Bank notes and specie to outstanding 
liabilities, demands for loanable funds exceeded the available supplies and interest rates rose. 
Rates on public securities, unaffected by the operation of usury laws, inevitably went higher than 
rates on private bills, shares and mortgages.  
As state assets were less risky and more liquid than mercantile bills of exchange, a great-
er share of the available supply of investible funds passed into the hands of the Government and 
the private sector experienced shortages of credit. Furthermore, the higher profits made on Gov-
ernment paper prompted clients of London bankers to withdraw their deposits (which paid no 
interest) in order to invest in liquid Government bills. This reduction or slower rise of cash de-
                                                            
13 The data on liabilities and assets of the Bank of England 1720-1815 refers to: Notes in Circulation; Drawing ac-
counts; Private Deposits; Total Deposits; Bullion Reserves; Public Securities: Private Bills and Notes Discounted; 
Private Securities, and Miscellaneous. It can be reconstructed from statistics published by Clapham (1944, pp. 295-
96) and Report from the Committee of Secrecy on the Expediency of Renewing the Charter of The Bank of England, 
Parliamentary Papers 1831-32 (volume 6) appendixes 5, 24 and 32. See also Bank of England (1967). 
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posited with London bankers reduced still further their capacities to create credit. Thus when 
pressure from the Bank forced the Treasury into the market and the market obtained no com-
pensatory reserve money in the form of discounts from the Bank of England, facilities for bor-
rowing money diminished and interest rates increased.14  
Although the Bank could only divert demands from the Treasury to the market, it held 
powers to refuse to discount bills or make advances to the private sector. In wartime when high-
er profits could be made from speculation in public securities, merchants, landowners, farmers 
and industrialists often found it difficult to secure accommodation from London bankers and 
turned to the Bank of England (Joslin 1954, Parliamentary Papers 1826, pp. 17, 43, 71,145 and 
207). Provided they expressed willingness to pay 5 per cent and the Bank complied with their 
requests, the level of private finance available would not fall. Moreover, as the Bank increased its 
loans the supply of reserve currency available to London bankers also rose and credit conditions 
in the metropolis did not become stringent.  
But when the Bank behaved as it did between December, 1795 and February, 1797 (when 
the Directors not merely forced the Treasury into the market but rationed credit to the private 
sector at the same time), the private sector inevitably experienced real difficulty in raising funds 
and interest rates rose sharply. Moreover, the effects of the Bank's policy went beyond re-
striction in loans and reserve currency and adversely affected the confidence of London Bankers, 
who withheld accommodation and operated with higher reserve ratios.15 While the experience of 
1795-97 revealed clearly how the liquidity of the London money market depended on the credit 
policies of the Bank of England the indirect dependence of banks outside the metropolis was only 
elucidated by Pressnell (1956).16  
 
During the restriction period, controversy arose not on the problem of the Bank's rela-
tions with London banks, a subject generally ignored at the time, but about its influence upon 
issues by banks outside the metropolis. One school of thought, ("bullionists") maintained that the 
expansion of credit by country bankers could be determined by the Bank. Malthus, for example, 
                                                            
14 Parliamentary Papers 1826, pp. 22, 35-7, 43, 72, 157, 175, 178, 180, 191-2, 212, 303; Committee of the House of 
Commons on 10 Naval Report, Parliamentary Papers 1805 (5), pp. 42, 47 and 69; Thornton (1802), pp. 281, 289 and 
291; Boyd (1811); Minutes of the Committee of the Treasury of the Bank of England 15.4.96, 23.6.96 and 3.11.96; 
Pitt Papers 03/08/115; Auckland Papers BLAM 34454; Wakefield (1797, pp. 26 and 54) and Monthly Magazine 
(May 1796, p. 326 and July 1796, p. 498).  
15 Parliamentary Papers 1826 (3), 35-7, 173-5, 190 and 215 and Pitt Papers 30/8/115. 
16 Although some appreciation of their subordinate position can be detected from the evidence of country bankers to 




considered it “a point of susceptible of complete demonstration that an increase in the issue of 
Bank of England notes is attended with a proportionate increase in the issue of country bank 
notes”.17 On the other side, a few contemporary writers denied all connexion between the Bank 
of England and the note issues of country banks; Bosanquet (a Bank Director), and economists 
such as Wheatley18 and (Chancellor of the Exchequer) Vansittart came close to this position.19  
 
Yet nearly all bankers who appeared before Parliamentary Committees investigating the 
monetary system during the war admitted they followed the lead of the Bank in the expansion 
and contraction of credit.20 Gilchrist, Chairman of the British Linen Bank, to take but one exam-
ple, stated quite unequivocally that, “If the Bank of England were to restrict the issues of course 
Scots Banks would find it necessary to restrict their issues”.21 Parliamentary reports had no 
doubt, to quote one, that “the Bank of England is at the head of circulation”, or to cite another 
that the credit of private bankers was “a superstructure raised upon the foundation of the Bank of 
England”.22  
 
Most contemporaries might well have shared such general opinions but the mechanisms 
through which the Bank brought about variations in the money supply at the end of the eight-
eenth century were not elucidated until modern times by Wood (1939), Clapham (2008a, b) and 
Pressnell (1956). Briefly stated, their conclusions are that the Bank affected the overall creation 
of credit by influencing the reserves of London banks and through them (indirectly) the reserves 
of banks located outside the metropolis. London bankers regulated the liabilities they incurred 
on reserves of specie and Bank notes.23 During the war years, when specie became increasingly 
                                                            
17 Malthus (1811, p. 457-8). See also Ricardo (1811/1951, pp. 87-88); Boyd, 1811, p. 23); Fetter (1957, p. 46); Parnell 
(1828) and Cannan (1925, p. 61).  
18 Wheatley, while classified by O’Brien (2004) as a “rigid” bullionist, conceded that the country banks could increase 
their banknotes significantly by varying their reserve ratios, and could cause an expansion of Bank of England notes 
(given its apparent adherence to the Real Bills Doctrine) by discounting bills with the Bank in times of pressure 
(O’Brien 2004, p. 181). 
19 Bosanquet (1810, p. 78); Wheatley (1803, pp. 209-21); Parliamentary Papers (1803/4-1812, vols. 1-22; vols. 23-
31); See also Silberling (1924) and Angell (1926), who argue that the Bank exercised little influence over variations 
in the money supply.  
20 Committee of the House of Commons on Suspension, 1797, Parliamentary Papers 1826 (3), pp. 142, 190 and 212; 
Committee of the House of Commons on Bullion, together with Minutes off Evidence from the Select Committee on 
the High Price of Gold Bullion in Parliamentary Papers 1810 (3), pp. 141 and 143. 
21 Committee of the House of Commons, Parliamentary Papers (1810, p. 114).  
22 Committee of the House of Commons on Suspension, 1797, Parliamentary Papers (1826), pp. 142-162; Cannan 
(1925, p. 61); and Committee of the House of Commons on Bullion; Parliamentary Papers 1810 (3), 90 and 13) 
23 E. Morgan (1943, p. 52); Committee of the House of Commons on Suspension, 1797; Parliamentary Papers (1826, 
pp. 35-7, 43 and 191-2); Boyd (1811, p. 23). 
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scarce in circulation24, Bank notes increased their importance as a form of reserve money, as well 
as becoming much more common as a means of payment (Figure 2). 
 
 
Figure 2. Coin supply and Bank of England notes, at constant prices of 1700. Sources: Bank of England 
(1967), Palma (2016); for the deflator, Broadberry et al (2015). 
 
 
2.3. Influence of the Bank of England on provincial banks 
 
 
Outside London the dominant component of the money supply (apart from coins and bills 
of exchange) consisted of notes issued and to a lesser extent deposits created by bankers. Since 
liabilities incurred by provincial banks were legally convertible either into gold or – after the 
suspension of specie payments in 1797 – Bank notes, some limits to their abilities to create credit 
existed, namely their need to retain a certain amount of reserve currency in order to meet fluctu-
ations in demand. Provincial banks did not however, regulate their liabilities simply upon a re-
serve of specie and Bank notes but on reserves which included gold, notes of the Bank of Eng-
land and portfolios of London assets. The latter consisted of highly liquid securities including 
exchequer bills convertible at call into cash and a balance on deposit with a corresponding Lon-
                                                            
24 Feavearyear (1931, p. 192) writes that “Not only was the country losing its gold, but it looked as though it would 
lose all its other metallic money as well”. Chadha and Newby (2013, p. 10) argue convincingly that concern about the 
state of circulation and credit was a motivation for the Suspension itself. 
  11 
don banker.25 London assets had to be purchased with London money. Deposits with London 
bankers could only be created or maintained if country bankers left a balance of Bank notes and 
specie in the hands of a banker in the metropolis or London bankers extended credit to them. 
Country banks obtained their reserve currency and London assets through several chan-
nels and in a variety of forms. Undoubtedly the most important source included deposits from 
clients who, as merchants, landowners, farmers and industrialists, traded either with or through 
the capital and received remittances in the form of specie, Bank notes, or, more commonly, bills 
of exchange drawn upon banks located in London. Deposits from officials concerned with the 
despatch of taxes to the Exchequer formed another but less important source of reserve funds. 
Other deposits came from local Government bodies, turnpike trusts and the carriage, haulage, 
canal and coastal shipping companies involved in the business of transporting passengers and 
goods overland and by sea. Given the dominance of London as a market for the consumption of 
provincial products and also as a centre of internal and international trade, the flow of funds 
from the metropolis to its hinterland provided country bankers with a more or less constant sup-
ply of London money or assets such as bills of exchange, readily convertible into money in the 
capital.  
Thus country banks could increase credit when permitted to draw upon the resources of 
banks in London. By the late eighteenth century nearly all provincial bankers had established 
close working arrangements with a bank in the capital. They maintained a balance of funds sur-
plus to their needs in London to redeem their bills of exchange and other drafts made payable 
there. London bankers also acted as intermediaries for country banks in the purchase of public 
and other securities sold on the metropolitan capital market (Pressnell 1956, pp. 45, 60-67, 76, 
77, 122 and 243-59.) In brief London bankers held and used the reserves of country bankers and 
could increase their reserves by extending credit to them.26 Banks located in the agricultural 
counties rarely called upon banks in London for advances, because usually their balances on de-
posit more than sufficed to meet any payments in the capital. But banks located in the industrial 
parts of the country often borrowed from metropolitan banks in order to provide their customers 
with facilities for the finance of their purchases through London.27 
 
Since the Bank of England could bring about changes in the amount of reserves (Bank 
                                                            
25 Pressnell (1956, pp. 116, 120, 197, 285-8, 408 and 416); Thornton (1802, pp. 215-7); Parliamentary Papers (1810, 
pp. 113-5 and 140); Leighton-Boyce (1958, pp. 111 and 116) and Sayers (1957, p. 110). 
26 Joslin (1954, pp. 180 and 183), Pressnell (1956, pp. 76-7, 80-1, 84, 98, 117-25, 285, 408 and 416), and Fulford 
(1953, p. 96). 
27 Morgan (1943, p. 21); Feaveryear (1931), and Pressnell (1956, pp. 76 and 288). 
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notes, specie and London assets) held by country bankers, it was in a position to influence their 
ability to create credit. The Bank could do little to affect the propensity of the population outside 
London to exchange cash for bank deposits, although the effects of its credit policies on confi-
dence might increase the general preference for liquidity. (Parliamentary Papers 1826 (3), pp. 35-
7). But the Bank could certainly inflate or deflate demand for provincial products in London by 
expanding or contracting the supply of credit afforded by London bankers and mutatis mutandis 
the flow of remittance from the capital to the countryside. Moreover, since London financed and 
handled a large share of the country's exports any alteration to supplies of metropolitan credit to 
provincial merchants and industrialists affected the level of receipts from exports. If the Bank 
deflated, country banks, with a time lag, would find that deposits from clients would either fall or 
fail to rise and unless they obtained reserve currency from an alternative source their ability to 
grant credit diminished.  
Their only important alternative consisted of advances from London bankers. But if the 
Bank restricted its credit either to the government or to its private customers, the ability of Lon-
don bankers to make advances to country banks declined, and because country banks depended 
on London banks for advances the Bank of England could thereby "influence" not merely the 
liquidity available to the London capital market, but the overall supply of bank money for the 
economy at large. Influence is not, however, the same as control and it cannot be proved that the 
expansion or contraction of credit by the Bank ever led to proportionate changes in the liabilities 
of the entire banking system. In the eighteenth century the Bank of England never occupied a 
position strong enough to maintain the money supply at some pre-determined level (Wood 
1939). It had, for instance, only slight influence on the volume of bills of exchange circulated as 
money. 
Inflows or outflows of bullion which accompanied changes in the country's balance of 
payments position also changed the gold reserves of private bankers and parri passu their ability 
to create credit. While movements in exports and imports or remittance on capital account were 
certainly not as independent of the policies pursued by the Bank of England as its Directors as-
serted at the time, there are no reasons to describe monetary policy as having not more than an 
"influence" on international trade (Parliamentary Papers 1810, pp. 95-7). Furthermore, changes 
in the level of cash on deposit with bankers could come about through changes in general prefer-
ences for liquidity without any contraction or expansion of credit by the Bank. Only if the Bank's 
policies influenced confidence could the Directors affect the public's disposition to switch be-
tween bank deposits and cash holdings. Here again the Bank policies constituted only one factor 
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among many which disposed the public towards liquidity (Morgan 1943, pp. 52-4). 
But by the rationing credit and forcing the Treasury into the market the Directors could 
force up interest rates and initiate a switch from bank deposits into public securities. Provided 
the money then expended by public departments did not pass back immediately into bank depos-
its private bankers would be prompted to contract liabilities. Fourthly, the Bank could not effec-
tively control its advances to the Treasury and any increase in government expenditure financed 
by the Bank created possibilities for a multiple expansion of credit throughout the banking sys-
tem. In order to restrain rises in the money supply during periods when the level of public ex-
penditure increased the Bank could only encourage the Treasury to borrow directly from the 
market and to cut back its own advances to the private sector.  
Perhaps most important of all, the Bank's powers over the money supply were limited by 
the fact that both London and country banks regulated their liabilities on flexible rather than 
fixed reserve ratios.28 Abundant statistical evidence demonstrates pronounced variations in the 
ratios maintained by country bankers for the early nineteenth century (Pressnell 1956, pp. 196, 
203-6 and 214; Sayers 1957, p. 177 and Morgan 1943, p. 12). Unfortunately no comparable sta-
tistics exist for London bankers, but remarks by Henry Thornton and John Wheatley's in their 
pamphlets suggest that similar flexibility prevailed in the capital.29 The range of variation de-
pended very much on confidence. If bankers took an optimistic view of business prospects their 
advances expanded. If their perceptions tended towards pessimism the money supply often con-
tracted. Many economic crises of the eighteenth century originated in changes of liquidity pref-
erence among the public and bankers. The ratio of reserves to the outstanding liabilities of the 
banking system usually fell in the upswings of business cycles and rose in downswings.30 
Given these constraints on the Bank's powers it is hence inappropriate to use verbs like 
“control” to refer to its status vis a vis the rest of the banking system. Since the Bank had never 
made any consistent attempt to exercise control it is difficult to decide how serious these limita-
tions were. The experience of the years 1795-97 suggest that the expansion of credit by the Bank 
                                                            
28 As did the Bank of England; Lovell (1957) shows that during 1720-97 the Bank did not maintain a fixed ratio of bullion 
to either its note issue or its outstanding liabilities of notes plus deposits.  
29 Thornton (1802, pp. 113 and 286); Wheatley (1802), Parliamentary Papers 1810 (3), 147-8 and Viner (1937, p.159). 
30 Report from the Select Committee Appointed to Take into consideration the Present State of Commercial Credit 1793, 
in Parliamentary Papers 1826 (3), pp. 125-33; Tooke (1838, pp. 177); Parliamentary Papers 1826 (3), p. 69 and 303; Report 
of the Lords Committee of Secrecy to Enquire into the Causes which Produced the Order of Council of 26 February 1797 
in Parliamentary Papers 1810 (3) pp. 284-5; Thornton, Paper Credit. p. 280 and Committee of the House of Commons on 
Resumption, Two reports from the Committee of Secrecy Appointed to consider the stale of the Bank of England with 
Reference to the Expediency of the Resumption of Cash Payments in Parliamentary Papers 1819 (3) [henceforth -pp I819 
(3)], 166-7.  
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created conditions for expansion by other banks and that any significant contraction of its ad-
vances either to the State or the private sector lead to some unmeasurable contraction in the 
overall money supply. Bankers operating at the time accepted this view and no record exists of 
credit contraction by the Bank coinciding with expansion by private banks. By the late eight-
eenth century if the Bank was not yet in control, it certainly stood at the head of the banking 
system.  
 
3. Why did the Restriction Period happen? 
 
3.1. Origins of the restriction period: the traditional narratives 
 
There is reasonably broad agreement in the literature about some basic facts which charac-
terize the Restriction Period. For long stretches of the eighteenth century the supplies of coins only 
barely made up for the economy’s growing demands for fractional payments. The seriousness of this 
problem intensified in the run up to, and during, the wars with France (1793-1815) when the event 
which was known to contemporaries as the “bullion crisis” happened: an expectations-driven “flight-
to-quality” increased levels of hoarding and increased the market price for bullion (Figure 3) to a 
point that for a short period of time coins all but disappeared from circulation (as seen in Figure 2, p. 
10).31 When market prices increased, people got more money for their precious metals on the market 
than at the mint. Minting decreased (at times ceasing altogether) because there was a better deal to 
be made on the market. 1£, 2£, and 5£ bills were issued by the Bank, and by provincial banks, to 
replace the hoarded (or exported) specie as a means of payment.32 
                                                            
31 Nonetheless notice that “There was no permanent and important divergence between the market price of gold and 
the mint prince before 1808: margins were known to bullion dealers, not ordinary people” (Clapham 2008b, p. 8). See 
also Feavearyear (1931, pp. 169, 183 and 187), Pressnell (1956, p. 159), Committee of the House of Commons on 
Suspension, 1797: Three Reports from the Committee of Secrecy on the Outstanding Demand on the Bank of Eng-
land and on the Restriction of the Payments in Cash, 1797, in Parliamentary Papers (1826); Thornton (1802, p. 97); 
and Mathias (2004, pp. 68-83). Notice that our Figure 2 shows coin supply greatly decreasing at this time, but even 
from the supply that remained it is possible that some was hoarded as opposed to remaining in circulation. 
32 It is tempting to interpret this shift in terms of Gresham’s law, but we do not favor that interpretation because 
“without some private information we would not observe either the phenomenon of circulation by tale or Gresham's 
Law, since these both revolve around what happens when one meets a uniformed seller.” (Velde, Weber, Wright 
1999; see also Redish 2000, p. 30). Hence Gresham’s law cannot apply here, as no one would have had any difficulty 
distinguishing Bank of England notes from coin. Instead, the agio evolved as shown in Figure 3; after some time 
coin gained a premium; equivalently, Bank of England notes gained a discount. (Under Gresham’s law this too is 
impossible, because this “law” assumes different currencies are accepted at the same nominal value, which is what 
drives the selection of “bad” coin when making payments). 
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Figure 3. Official and market price of gold. Sources: Officer and Williamson (2016a).  
 
In response to this, within the metropolitan area and increasingly in the provinces as well, 
notes issued by the Bank circumvented the problem left by the negligence (or incapacity) of the gov-
ernment to mint adequate supplies of coins. The notes of the Bank of England increased dramatically 
after 1797, in part to compensate for the reduced availability of precious metals; these were flowing 
to France which was remonetizing following the collapse of its paper currency system (Roberts and 
Velde 2016). This contrasted with the situation prevailing until late in the eighteenth century, when 
Bank of England notes had seldom circulated beyond a thirty mile radius of central London. Fur-
thermore, the dramatic expansion of the balance sheet of the Bank of England after 1797 was accom-
panied by a similar expansion that of the balance sheets of provincial banks (Pressnell 1956). By the 
beginning of the Revolutionary War the amount of their notes outstanding throughout Great Brit-
ain probably equaled the issues by the Bank, and by the battle of Waterloo may have exceeded 
them.33 Nonetheless, this expansion would not have been possible without that of the Bank of Eng-
land. 
 
There are two reasons usually given in the literature for the Restriction Period. First, it was 
the result of demand for liquidity in the context of a military emergency. Second, it was the result of 
France’s increased demand for precious metals following its return to a commodity-money system. 
As France’s remonetization began to drain gold out of the country (a couple of years before Sus-
pension) the Bank immediately starting rationing its discounts (Clapham 1944, p. 269). This was 
not enough to prevent the dwindling of the Bank’s reserves, which fell from 8 million pounds ster-
                                                            
33 Coppieters (1955, p.1), Pressnell (1956, p.15, 16, 136, 142 and 159). 
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ling in 1791 to as just over 1 million during 1797.34 Evidently, these two motives interacted; and 
indeed, it would be too simplistic to say that the Suspension was simply due to the Bank’s low 
reserves. During 1783-4, for instance, the Bank carried business for over a year with less bullion 
than at time of Suspension fourteen years later. This had been possible because “1783 was a year 
of peace with commercial prospects … while 1797 was a year of dangerous war” (Clapham 1944, 
p. 256).  
 
These two reasons are focused on the role of short-run pressures on the Bank’s reserves.35 
We argue, however, that while such liquidity-type reasons are important (as necessary conditions), 
they cannot explain the Suspension’s success. Indeed, not only did the British public accepted the 
new state of affairs36, but the Bank of England’s reserves grew back to 8 million by late 1799, and the 
public’s confidence in most provincial banks was restored as well (Feavearyear 1931, p. 177). The 
above-mentioned factors traditionally mentioned in the literature help explain the timing of the Re-
striction Period, but they cannot explain why it worked, especially in light of similar but failed expe-
riences in the continent – including in the Netherlands (Hart et al 1997, p. 96). To understand this 
success, we need to take a longer view; we argue that it was the Bank’s long-run reputation which 
mattered.37 
 
3.2. A new long-term and quantitative view 
 
All societies require liquidity, but they face restrictions in the form of access to precious 
metals or commitment problems which do not allow for paper money to be held and to circulate. 
Hence, demand for liquidity alone cannot explain the timing, or the sudden scale, of the adoption 
of paper money. In turn, short-term military pressure can help us understand the timing of the 
adoption, but cannot explain why earlier pressures of the same nature had not led to the same 
                                                            
34 Feavearyear (1931, p. 177). Roberts and Velde (2014) argue that following France’s remonetisation, which started in 
the Spring of 1795, “[T]he subsequent drain on the Bank of England’s reserves forced a suspension of convertibility of the 
Bank’s notes in February 1797”. See also Feavearyear (1931, p. 167) or Clapham (1944, p. 169-70). For the continental 
capital inflight to Britain after 1793, see Neal (1990, p. 180, 216-7) or Clapham (1944, p. 257). 
35 To these short-term pressures we must add two others which are not usually mentioned in the literature. First, this was 
also a period of limited access to precious metals for Europe as a whole. Precious metals, which Britain obtained through 
trade, were the critical input to the production of coin, and this motive combined with increasing hoarding levels to cause 
minting output to diminish to historically low levels (including several years of zero minting) from the 1790s to the 1810s 
(Challis 1992). Second, this was a period of robust economic growth in Britain, both at the intensive (per capita) and exten-
sive (population) levels, as well as a period of structural change and increased urbanization. All of these factors increased 
the demand for banknotes as means of payment. 
36 In Monday 27th of February 1797 hundreds of leading merchants publicly agreed not to refuse Bank of England 
notes in payment, and to make provision to make all payments in such matters (Feavearyear 1931, p. 170; see also 
Shin 2015). Soon after, in March 2nd, an Act was passed which allowed the Bank to issue notes of less than £5, and 
Bank of England notes became more common all over the country (Feavearyear 1931, p. 171). 
37 Chadha and Newby (2013, p. 10) also place emphasis on the Bank’s reputation: “practical men of the City of London  
[which publicly committed not to refuse the Bank’s notes] would not have supported policy in which they did not have 
faith, and therefore merchant’s willingness to support the Bank notes can be seen as a testimony to the Bank’s credibility”. 
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outcome. Nor can it explain why the policy ultimately succeeded, rather than turning into con-
ventional debt monetization for fiscal purposes, which would have led to inflation and to the ul-
timate abandonment of the system, as happened in France. Equally, demand for precious metals 
in France following the failure of its own paper money policy can explain why pressure was ex-
erted on the equilibrium price of precious metals in Britain, but not why the adoption of the Re-
striction Period policies was possible as a way out. 
 
In order to understand why the Restriction Period was possible and ultimately successful, 
we need to consider the history of the Bank prior to that event. So far, scholars have analyzed this 
mostly at a qualitative level. While the balance sheets of the Bank of England are well-known, eco-
nomic historians have lacked comparable measures for both coin supply and broader forms of money, 
leading to the possibility of only analyzing the outcomes in a rather unsystematic manner, for years 
when information happens to be available.38  We now take advantage of new data on money supply, 
which, by contrast, allows for a much more detailed quantitative analysis, which can then be cross-
checked against historical events. 
 
The picture that results from our exercise shows that, throughout most of the eighteenth 
century, the Bank’s actions during times of warfare did not proceed in parallel to those of the 
government. While times of war were associated with enormous increases in military expendi-
ture (Figure 4)39, and, through a “ratchet effect’’, permanent increases in fiscal capacity and gov-
ernment size (O’Brien 1988; see also our appendix Figure A3)40, prior to the 1790s the actions on 
the fiscal side of government finance were not mirrored by the Bank of England.41 Indeed, up to 
the 1790s there is no evidence that the Bank of England expanded banknotes relative to coin supply 
faster at times of war (Figure 5), nor that the size of fiat (more broadly defined) in circulation grew 
any faster in times of war (as is visible in Figure 1). In several periods of war, such as the American 
revolutionary war period, these stocks actually decreased. This was largely because wars were 
often associated with financial crises and, prior to Bagehot's doctrine well into the nineteenth 
century, the Bank of England’s first and foremost priority was to defend its own position, main-
taining adequate reserves to avoid a run.  
                                                            
38 For instance, Roberds and Velde (2014) write that the “Bank’s note circulation peaked at £28m in 1814, more than the 
gold coined during the recoinage of 1773–79”. 
39 In Figure A1 of the appendix we show instead real military spending in per capita terms, and the same basic pat-
tern emerges. 
40 Given the importance of military expenses for the government’s budget, it is not surprising that the equivalent 
figure for the size of government looks rather similar as well; see Figure A2 in the appendix. 
41 Furthermore, the fact that the Bank of England was a private institution meant that profits from seigniorage 
largely accrued to stockowners rather than the government, so direct monetary finance was not an important source 
of funds for the government. (See, however, O’Brien and Palma 2016). 
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Figure 4. Total military spending 1696-1815, at constant prices of 1700. Total military spending corresponds 
to spending by the army plus spending by the navy. Naval spending equals total grant plus navy debt plus 
transport (added from the army), plus funding operations. Army spending equals total grants (grants for army 
and ordinance services including militia) plus transport (added to the navy) plus funding operations, plus votes 
of credit, plus subsidies and pay of foreign troops, plus Irish military expenditure (army, ordinance and votes of 
credit). The shaded areas correspond to years of war. Sources: For naval and military spending, O’Brien and 
Duran (2010), for the deflator, Broadberry et al (2015). 
 
The data in these figures shows clearly that, unlike what has been shown to be the case 
for military spending or fiscal capacity, until the 1790s war had no discernible effect on the 
growth of fiat supply (which might have increased for fiscal reasons at times of war though lend-
ing from the Bank to the Government). Only in the last decade of the century would this change 
decisively; it was then that in real terms, both notes of the bank of England – and the size of fi-
nancial intermediation – expanded considerably.42 As one authority (who, unlike us, takes a nega-
tive view of the extension of the Restriction Period beyond the immediate resolution of the 1797 
liquidity problem) writes, “while there was no forcing of the paper issues there was little if any 
limitation of them” (Feaveayear 1931, p. 178). 
 
                                                            
42 It is also the case that provincial banking expanded gradually in the second half of the eighteenth century, and 
considerably right after 1797. The direct observable evidence concerns, however, the number of banks, as the issues 
of each cannot be calculated (Pressnell 1956); see also Joslin (1954). According to Coppetiers (1955), country banks 
rose from 280 in 1793 to 657 in 1815 and London Banks with privileges to discount at the Bank from 63 in 1792 to 
80 in 1814. As the Bullion Committee pointed out, commercial discounts had greatly increased since 1796, and the 
quantity of country bank notes did so as well. These, it was argued, in practice depended closely on the quantity of 
Bank of England paper notes in circulation (Feavearyear 1931, p. 183).  
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Figure 5. The ratio between Bank of England notes and coin supply, 1694-1815. Sources: Bank of England 
(1967), Palma (2016) 
 
Even in wartime the state did not flood the market with bills and credits delivered from 
the Bank in the form of discounts, and notes provided the reserves needed not simply to com-
plement bullion but to assist the continued operation of external and internal trade in the ad-
verse circumstances occasioned by warfare. The South Sea Bubble episode (which did not con-
cern the actions of the Bank of England, although it had initially tried to get involved) excepted, 
there were, in short, no serious financial crises and little crowding out of commercial activity 
upon which tax revenues depended because both the state and bank behaved prudently even in 
wartime, when pressures to print money invariably intensified.43 
 
During the Great Recoinage (1696) and the Jacobite invasion of 1745, temporary suspen-
sion of cash payments had been necessary. In both cases convertibility was soon restored, sug-
gesting to the public that suspensions did not last longer than necessary. Decade after decade of 
good behavior matured to maintain supplies of reserve assets, money and credit in line with the 
increasing demands of the private economy, and provided creditors with a reserve asset – Bank 
notes – and means of exchange in which they deposited increasing confidence. At the end of a 
long history of prudence, when demands by the state for both credits and loans intensified to 
levels never before experienced, the economy was finally well prepared to make a transition to 
inconvertible paper, which was indispensable for the conduct of more expensive warfare coupled 
with the continuation of flexible support for the demands of the private economy.  
                                                            
43 Hence Adam’s Smith remark with which we started this paper, “the stability of the Bank of England is equal to 
that of the British government’’ (Smith 2003/1776). Credibility was a two-way street. 
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3.3. 1793-1815: extraordinary measures for extraordinary times 
 
Though the French wars were not completely unanticipated – rearmament had been go-
ing on for decades, much prior to 1793 or even 1789 (Knight 2013) – their scale and intensity 
surprised all contemporaries. Compared with earlier conflicts in the century, the wars against revo-
lutionary, and then Napoleonic, France were simply of a different order of magnitude. With the ex-
ception of the two twentieth-century world wars, the Napoleonic wars cost more lives in battle than 
any other modern conflict (Clodfelter 2008, p.152).44 For the British, these wars were something 
altogether different from earlier conflicts, whether measured by number of battles, military expendi-
ture (Figure 4), or war casualties (Figure 6). Importantly, while previous eighteenth-century wars 
were fought on the oceans, overseas or in the colonies, the wars of the 1790s-1810s corresponded to 
a perceived threat to the security of human life and property – certainly that of the aristocracy – in 
the British Isles themselves.  
 
 
Figure 6. British external conflict war casualties, 1696-1870 (six-year moving average). Sources: Dincecco and 
Prado (2012) for 1700-88 and 1816-1870 (which for the latter period rely on the Correlates of War project) 
and our own series otherwise (see the appendix), relying on Clodfelter (2008).  
 
Although throughout the 1780s the British government had been rearming and preparing 
for an eventual conflict with France, the scale of the French revolution and its subsequent course can 
                                                            
44 Given that the population was much smaller in this period than in the twentieth century, this may be in fact an under-
statement. 
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be interpreted as a “black swan”-type event to hit the English economy. The revolution itself and its 
military aftermath, such as mass conscription after 1793 during the French Revolutionary Wars 
(Levé en masse), and the threat of the Grand Armée were truly new and unprecedented events.  
 
The Bank of England’s response did not simply consist of increased lending in the form of a 
shock or a series of shocks to the money supply, but to what in modern terms we might call a change 
in the systematic component of monetary policy.45 The political elites who owned contracts set in 
nominal terms were willing to tolerate these risky measures because they knew that should the 
French successfully invade, their properties (and perhaps their lives) were at risk.46 The arrival of 
a French fleet to Bantry Bay, Ireland, in December 1796, followed by a French landing in Fishguard, 
Wales, in February 1797, induced the elites to accept the regime change.47 A large number of mer-
chants all over the country signed (and publicly announced) declarations in which they promised to 
accept and keep using banknotes. The most prominent of these meetings was that of London; while 
the Bank of England had a role in arranging this meeting48, the fact is that it could not force the mer-
chants to take that decision, which was also publicly announced through publication in The Times.  
 
The standard account is that although the Directors could legally refuse requests for credit 
from the Treasury, in practice they had little choice but to accede to the demands of the state. There 
is some truth in this. Outright refusals at critical times could have disrupted military and naval mobi-
lization and no government would long tolerate the frustration of its strategic policies by a private 
corporation. The Bank had enjoyed a monopoly as a joint stock bank of issue for continued services 
to the state and Ministers took good care to make the Bank's privileges subject to periodic review 
and renewal.49 According to this viewpoint, the Directors recognized that they had to obey and al-
ways did so. 
                                                            
45 As we detail below, this consisted not only in the quick expansion of the Bank’s balance sheet (accompanied by a 
similar trend in provincial banks), but also in the issue of much lower banknote denominations, opening the way to 
their much more widespread usage; until 1797 bearer notes of less than £5 issued by any English bank had been 
more or less illegal (Feavearyear 1931, p. 163). 
46 It would be expectable that dropping convertibility would generate at least some inflation. Politically influent 
elites would have feared the effects of this on their nominal incomes. For a related argument which applies to a later 
period, see Eichengreen (1992), who argues that the interwar gold standard was not dropped earlier, among other 
reasons, because of the limited political influence of the groups that would gain from inconvertibility and deprecia-
tion. When Pitt promised the Bank in early 1797 that its suspension would be confirmed in Parliament – as it turned 
out to be – he must have known that support would exist. And given the help that the Bank gave to the government, 
the Bank’s insolvency would have been seen as an outcome to avoid, especially in the wartime circumstances of 1797 
and the years that followed. 
47 Other factors were also at play, as discussed in section 2.2.  
48 The meeting was sponsored by the Bank with no involvement by the government (Shin 2015, p. 424). 
49 Clapham (1944, vol 1, p. 177) and Committee of the House of Commons on the Bank, Parliamentary Papers (1807, 
volume 2, p. 111. See also Broz and Grossman (2004). 
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Indeed, the Director’s conflict with the Treasury during the years 1795-97 reveals how their 
power to curtail loans to the government consisted of no more than putting pressure on the Chancel-
lor to borrow more money directly from the London money market.50 And it was also the case that 
after August 1797, the Treasury increased its demands on the Bank to take a contracted amount 
of Exchequer Bills, and to purchase more on the market, under a gentleman’s understanding that  
the Bank should not resell them (Clapham 2008b, p. 11).  
 
However, two facts prevent our acceptance of the idea that the Bank of England was simply 
following government orders. First, the Bank could deliberately ration lending to the govern-
ment, and in many instances did so (Clapham 2008b, p. 5; Duffy 1982, p. 80). Second, while after 
Suspension took place the Governor of the Bank often complained of having to meet increasing 
Navy and other government bills to greater amounts that it seemed to them reasonable (Clap-
ham 2008a, p. 266), the quantitative evidence suggests that total government securities held by 
the Bank in fact decreased in the years immediately following the Suspension (Figure 7). 
 
Figure 7. Total government securities held by the Bank of England, millions of £ in constant prices of 
1700. Total securities include government debt plus other government securities held by the bank. 
Source: Bank of England (1967), and for the deflator, Broadberry et al (2015). 
                                                            
50 Committee of the House of Commons on Suspension 1797, in Parliamentary Papers (1826, volume 3, pp. 17, 73, 
145, 157 and appendix 9). The monetary history of these three years is also revealing for the light it sheds on the influ-
ence exerted by the Bank and the Treasury on the liquidity position of London's money markets. Between 1795 and 1797 
the Chancellor of the Exchequer as head of the Treasury attempted to comply with the Directors' pressure to market 
bonds rather than bills and to issue a higher proportion of bills direct to the capital market. Whenever the Bank ex-
changed its notes for exchequer and other government bills, subsequent expenditure by the navy, army and other depart-
ments of state added to the supply of Bank notes in the hands of the public, who then deposited surplus cash with private 
bankers. Finding themselves with more reserve currency in their tills bankers then granted additional credit to clients and 
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It seems likely that after Suspension Pitt and the Treasury followed the Directors pres-
sure from 1795-97 and tried to contain short term borrowing by departments of state by bor-
rowing long term (bond finance substitution for bill finance, i.e. short term credit), and by in-
creasing inflows of new and old taxation to fund warfare. Bond finance left the Bank to provide 
liquidity for loan contractors and appears as private assets on the Bank's account. The Bank was 
anxious to avoid rationing credit for the private sector and so was the Treasury because that 
would lower revenues from taxation. They were trying to rebalance competing demands on the 
money market. 
 
The observed decrease in government securities held by the bank was briefly interrupted 
around the time of the Treaty of Amiens, when net lending stagnated. It was only as the war 
against Napoleon intensified, that Bank of England purchases of government securities did so as 
well, jumping from less than £20 million in 1810 to over £32 million in 1813 in real terms (con-
stant prices of 1700). In any case, what is certain is that the Bank was more than a pawn of the 
Government; it had a certain level of autonomy and independence, and cared for its own reputa-
tion. Indeed, "Much of the correspondence written and verbal, between Pitt and the Bank ... con-
cerned mainly ... pressure for advances which the Bank so stubbornly resisted” (Clapham 2008a, 
p. 267). 
 
3.4. Inflation and the Bank of England 
 
 
Despite the accusation of the bullion committee and other subsequent analysts, the Bank’s 
suspension during 1797-1821 was unlikely to have been responsible for much of the observed 
wartime inflation pattern. Two motives allow for this conclusion. First, prices had been slowly 
rising since the 1760s, with an acceleration noticeable from the late 1780s (Figure 8). The mo-
tives for this include real-side factors such as the growth of the population (Clark 2001), and af-
ter 1793, shortages associated with the war economy, a concentration of bad harvests, disrup-
tions to trade, taxes, and the reallocation of resources towards the army and navy. Secondly, 
prices peaked in 1813 and started falling after that date, hence after the first bullion committee 
had been set up but well before convertibility was restored. (And at a point in time when it was 




Figure 8. Price level in Britain, index with 1700=1. Source: Broadberry et al (2015). 
 
It was Parliament which ultimately forced resumption as early as 1819-21. But this does 
not prove that the Government had been committed to dynamically consistent policies all along 
while the Bank was not, or that the Bank was just blindly following Government orders. Indeed 
from a modern perspective, fiat money is a more efficient monetary system.51 The stability of a 
fiat money system requires that the monetary authority is able to credibly commit to a stable 
inflation rate, but inconvertible banknotes may not have been the main culprit behind wartime 
inflation, as there was no simple causal chain from the quantity of Banknotes in circulation to the 
price level (Clapham 2008b, p. 16-19).52 Inflation as well as the market price of gold fell consid-
erably once the war was over, as markets opened, the balance of payments adjusted, and the war 
drain ended (Clapham 2008b, p. 37). It had not been the case that the Bank had wanted Suspen-
sion to continue indefinitely, or even that it had always been in less of a hurry to restore it. De-
spite the fact that inconvertibility was rather profitable for the Bank, as early as October 1797 
the Bank had wanted to resume payments. (Pitt had not allowed this, despite the Bank’s reserves 
having largely recovered by then; see Clapham 2008b, p. 4.) Even if some inflation did result 
from the Bank’s actions, this may have optimal. As Clapham (2008b, p. 32) put it: “No one said 
frankly – accept a measure of inflation for victory’s sake”. Overall, there is no evidence to con-
clude that the Bank followed irresponsible policies. As Duffy (1892, p. 81) concludes, “the Bank’s 
awareness of the need to regulate discounts did not fall into abeyance during the Restriction”.53 
 
                                                            
51 The resumption of convertibility at the prewar standard was predated by deflation which continued after 1821 and 
created difficulties for the transition from a wartime to a peacetime economy (Acworth 1925). It also led to “specula-
tive ventures in the capital markets, and the eventual collapse of the financial system … followed by widespread 
bankruptcies and unemployment” (Neal 1998, p. 53). Neal takes a more positive view of its long-term consequences. 
52 Indeed, some wartime inflation peaks “cannot be connected at all closely with the mere quantity of notes in circu-
lation” (Clapham 2008b, p. 9). 
53 Even the Bank’s theoretical adherence to the real bills doctrine did not correspond to its de-facto discount policy 
(Duffy 1982). 
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4. Long-term consequences  
 
4.1. A policy shift 
 
The consequences of the new regime of paper money would continue to be felt for a long 
time, despite the establishment of the classical gold standard in 1819-21. Once people got used to 
fiat money, the system never went back to the predominantly coin-based system which had been 
in place before the late-eighteenth century. The 1793-1815 wars caused a monetary policy re-
gime shift. The shift was conditioned, and indeed made possible, not just by the military and geo-
political circumstances of the last decade of the eighteenth century but also, importantly, by a 
prior history of prudent financial management by the Bank as well as the state. The state, while 
accepting as necessary the Bank’s liquidity provision, always refrained from requesting amounts 
that would lead to problems such as unstable currencies and exchange rates, hyperinflation, and 
consequently widespread refusals to accept notes and deposits, frequent features of comparable 
experiments with public banks linked to states on the mainland.  
 
Figures 1 and 5 show that the Bank of England shifted gears in the 1790s, but it would be 
wrong to assume that after 1821 there was a return to the previous status quo. Figure 9 now extends 
the horizon of Figure 4 to the mid-nineteenth century, emphasizing the special nature of the Re-
striction Period. The figure shows three important facts about this period. First, after a long period 
of stability, there was a spike in Bank of England notes at the time of the Restriction Period. Second, 
when the supply of notes was later reduced, the reversal was only partial: the level did not return 
that of the 1790s. Third, and crucially, the previously stationary distribution then gained an upward 
trend – the growth which started in the 1790s continued into the nineteenth century.54 The regime 
change to the system caused by the Bank Restriction in the 1790s persisted well into the future, long 
after that act was repealed. Through a process of path-dependence, it caused a permanent shift to a 
fiat-based monetary system, which – despite the later imposition of the classical gold standard (Re-
dish 1993) – allowed for continuous growth of fiat money relative to slower-growing quantities of 
precious metals well into the nineteenth century. 
                                                            
54 The endpoint for our analysis is1844, when the Currency School triumphed by imposing a 100% reserve ratio of specie 
through Peel’s act 
  26 
 
Figure 9. The ratio of Bank of England notes to coin supply, 1696-1844. Despite the existence of bills of ex-
change throughout the entire period, growth during the Restriction Period is likely to be underestimated rela-
tive due to the spectacular growth of private provincial banking, which here lies unaccounted for, especially 
after 1797. Sources: for banknotes, Bank of England (1967); for coin supply, Palma (2016). 
 
What our new long-term data (Figures 1 and 5) hence emphasize is that it was a long his-
tory of previous prudence by the Bank of England that allowed this to occur successfully. Even-
tually, when it was ultimately necessary, the Bank and the government abandoned their previous 
orthodoxy; this move was successful thanks to a century of accumulated reputation for trustwor-
thiness which led the public to believe that the value of the Bank’s paper money (and the public 
securities that backed it) would be honored.55 This helps us understand the context behind the 
pre-Bagehot doctrine mind-set of the Bank’s directors – by the nineteenth century the Bank was 
playing a much more central public role than it had before, but there was awareness by its Direc-
tors that the success of its policies had been largely due to the long-term accumulation of a repu-
tation for prudence; only very “special times” would justify deviating from such policies.56 
 
4.2. Unintended long-term consequences  
 
The long-term consequences of the Restriction Period were profound at several levels. In 
                                                            
55 This belief was based not only on the returns to a century of “good behavior” by the Bank but also with the pub-
lic’s belief that Britain would ultimately win the war – an outcome towards which the Bank of England’s support to 
the government turned out to be more than incidental as well (O’Brien and Palma 2016). 














1700 1720 1740 1760 1780 1800 1820 1840
Bank restriction period (1797-1821)
  27 
the words of Clapham, “Englishmen of rank and file – wage earners and small traders – knew 
little of paper money, and in the early years of suspension they had learnt its use only gradually” 
(Clapham 2008a, p. 162).57 But it was with, and indeed because of, the 1790-1810s wars and the 
Restriction Period that most people learned to use it. While up to the 1790s £10 notes were the 
lowest note denomination58 issued by the Bank of England (over £1,000 in 2015 prices)59, it was 
only in 1793, at the start of the war against Napoleonic France, that £5 notes were first issued.60  
 
Denominations of £5 were in turn followed by £2 and £1 banknotes, issued in 1797, co-
inciding with the Restriction Period. Crucially, also allowing for a margin of contemporaneous 
inflation, £1 was then just enough to pay a laborer’s weekly wage (Schwarz 1985).61 Despite the 
Bank’s suspension and dramatic expansion of banknotes in circulation, Bank of England notes 
were accepted by the public and began to be used not only as a store or value or at the retail lev-
el, but also, for the first time, as a means of exchange for ordinary people. Bank of England notes 
became legal tender through a 1811 act of Parliament, but they had in fact been de-facto legal 
tender since the Bank Restriction Act of May 1797.62 Furthermore, the Bank of England’s ex-
pansion encouraged that of provincial banks, which held reserves at the Bank, to expand their 
issues as well.63 The increased interest of the public in the usage of banknotes is suggested by 
Figure 10, which shows not only that written references to banknotes spiked at the time of sus-
pension, but also that interest in them continued thereafter, mirroring what we find in Figure 8. 
In the words of Shin (2015, p. 418), “the experience of paper money had a profound impact upon 
the popular notion of money”. 
 
Once people got used to using paper money there was no going back. Despite the adop-
tion of the “classical gold standard” in 1821, banknotes continued their steady rise as a percent-
age of the total money supply into the nineteenth century. For the State, a more monetized econ-
                                                            
57 See also Clapham (2008b, p. 2-3), who writes: “As gold became scarcer the £1 and £2 notes were used more and 
more for wage-paying and retail trade” 
58 Payments through the Bank of Amsterdam (which did not issue circulating notes) were even larger and exclusive-
ly wholesale (Quinn and Roberds 2014, p. 6).  
59 £10 in 1793 correspond to £1,058 in 2015 prices (Officer and Williamson 2016b). 
60 Additionally, the modal denomination of Bank of England notes prior to suspension in 1797 had been £20 (Hot-
son 2012, p. 12). 
61 The Government was understandably concerned with counterfeits and stiff penalties – execution (or under miti-
gating circumstances, transportation) – were promised for “uttering false bank notes”. This was enforced: for in-
stance in 1817, there were 32 capital convictions, 95 other convictions “for having forged Bank Notes in Possession”, 
while only 15 people were acquitted. (House of Commons Papers, Volume 16, p.222, in Parliamentary Papers 1818). 
62 For a recent review, see Chada and Newby (2013, pp. 11-12). 
63 The number of country banks rose from 280 in 1793 to 657 in 1815. The London Banks with privileges to dis-
count at the Bank rose from 63 in 1792 to 80 in 1814. This was accompanied by dramatic expansion of the balance 
sheet of provincial (and London) banking after 1797 (Pressnell 1956, Joslin, 1954, Coppetiers 1955). 
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omy was also easier to tax, further encouraging a positive loop between monetization and state 
capacity (Capie 2004, O’Brien and Palma 2016). As the nineteenth century advanced and the pro-
cess of modern economic growth started to take place, increased monetization helped attenuate 
deflationary pressures, though it would not completely eliminate them, especially later in the 
century. 
 
Figure 10. Google Ngram viewer for “Banknotes”, from the corpus of “English”, for the period 1650-1840 
(with zero smoothing).  
 
Once paper money became the dominant means of payment, coin never regained its promi-
nence. Furthermore, while convertibility was restored in 1821, and Peel’s Act of 1844 (predated by 
Palmer’s rule) curtailed the liberties of the Bank in terms of issuing paper money, the restriction that 
the Bank’s issues had to be fully backed (or partially so after Palmer’s rule) was less of a constraint to 
the growth of paper money than it may at first appear. Reserves could be in the form of either bullion 
or public securities (including deposits), and the latter were available elastically. And secondly, con-
vertibility could be again dropped as needed. Faced with a real shock the Bank of England temporari-
ly suspended Peel’s act as early as 1847, and issued fiat money without being constrained to having 
full gold backing (Dornbusch and Frenkel 1984). 
 
5. Econometric analysis 
 
5.1. Structural breaks 
 
We now perform a number of structural break tests, which are likelihood-ratio (or Wald) 
tests of whether the coefficients of a time-series regression of the size of fiat relative to coin supply 
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vary over the periods defined by break dates set a priori.64 Notice that unlike what is the case with 
familiar Chow tests, these tests are robust to unknown forms of heteroscedasticity. 
 
The results are shown in Table 2. There are two test-type options. The first is to perform 
a test for a single, endogenously determined break. An alternative is to perform a multiple struc-
tural break test. For this second test, we need to set candidate dates. Both narrative historical 
evidence and Figure 6 suggest possible breaks in 1797 and 1821. For each test option, and for a 
variety of specifications and subsamples, we focus on the ratio of Bank of England notes to coin 
supply.65 The results are shown in columns (1) to (6).  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 

































































p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 
Table 2. Structural break tests following a time-series regression of the “BoE notes/coin” varia-
ble on a constant and a time (years) variable; standard errors are robust the trim is 15%. 
 
                                                            
64 Our formal discussion of structural change is focused solely on the issue of testing parameter stability, and on the 
first moment of the distribution; cf. Stock (1994), Perron (2006), Bai and Perron (1998). 
65 This is in fact a lower bound to the true notes/coin ratio, since the banknotes of provincial are not included. 
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Whether we specify the equation in levels or natural logs, we reject the null hypothesis of 
no-structural break at our key dates.66 These formal tests confirm that a structural break hap-
pened between 1796 and 1800, and another happened around 1821, a result also easily visible by 
inspection of Figures 1 and 6. In the case of single-break tests for the natural logs specifications 
– column (4) – the tests suggest that the break occurred in 1822, but this is because we are as-
suming that only one break occurred, while visual inspection of Figures 1 and 6 suggests that at 
least two did. Indeed, this is what the multiple break tests in columns (5) and (6) show. 
 
5.2. Unit root tests 
 
The break found in specification in columns (1), (3) is close to the trim, but at the same 
time, that of columns (2) and (4) is not clearly superior, not only because more than one break 
occurred – as suggested by the results of the multiple break test – but also because structural 
break tests may not be valid in the presence of unit roots (and vice versa). Since the distribution 
is stationary until 1790, this is not a problem for that period. And the fact that a unit root ap-
pears around the time of the Restriction Period is precisely the main point we are making. As 
Figure 6 suggests, the distribution gains a persistent upwards drift or trend after 1797.67 The 
bank Restriction Period of 1797-1821 is one of disruption, but after the imposition of the classical 
gold standard in 1821 the distribution does not return to its pre-1797 mean. 
 
We now formally test this visual conjecture using augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) tests. 
The results for the ratio of Bank of England notes to coin supply are in Table 3. For each specifi-
cation, the number of lags has been chosen according to the BIC criteria. Starting with the full 
sample, nonstationarity cannot be rejected if no drift or trend terms are allowed (column 1), as 
we would expect from visual inspection of Figure 6. Even if the sample is restricted to the pre-
1797 period, nonstationarity is not rejected because of an early trend in the first quarter of the 
century (column 2); but if the sample is restricted to the 1726-1796 period, nonstationarity is 
safely rejected (column 3). As we would expect, extending the sample up to 1821, and even ex-
cluding the pre-1726 period, the distribution is once again nonstationarity (column 4), a result 
that evidently also holds if the sample is instead extended to 1844.68  
                                                            
66 There may have also been a small increase in the mean of the distribution in the first quarter of the eighteenth 
century. 
67 The alternative methodology of Figure 1 leads to the same pattern of results. 
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p-value 0.5423 0.2596 0.00 0.6532 0.0702 0.0209 0.0000 0.1078 0.1988 0.1390 0.0046 0.5705 
 




Let us not lose sight of the forest in the middle of these econometric trees. Our breaks in sta-
tionarity69 simply identify periods of important historical change. What they suggest is that while 
the period before 1797 was one of remarkable stability, the Restriction Period of 1797-1821, repre-
sented a historical discontinuity, and one which would continue to be felt after 1821 as well, when 
the distribution gained an upward trend. Some of our econometric tests also cannot reject a structur-
al break in the first quarter of the eighteenth century, but there are three important differences rela-
tive to the post-1797 period. First, the statistical evidence in favor a break around 1720 is weaker 
than is the case for 1797. Second, the economic magnitude of the break of the first quarter of the cen-
tury is much smaller too, as is shown in Figures 1, 4 and 7. But more importantly, unlike what hap-
pened after 1797, the break was followed by a long period of stability. In other words, there may have 
been a small upwards shift in the mean of the distribution around 1720, but the distribution did not 
gain a trend or unit root, unlike what would happen in the late century. By contrast, the Restriction 




The Restriction was associated with one of the first successful transitions to a paper money 
system for a major economy.70 Despite the eventual return to convertibility in 1821, coin supply nev-
er regained its previously central role in money supply: the age of the banknote had begun. Britain’s 
regime shift was mechanically implemented through the Bank Restriction Act but it was the result of 
two distinct causes. Over the short run, it resulted from the unusually dangerous military circum-
stances of the last decade of the century, combined with increased pressure on France’s return to a 
commodity-money system. These reasons have been emphasized before in the literature, and we 
agree that they mattered. But alone, they would have not sufficed for the policy’s success. The public 
would not have accepted money if it anticipated loss of value.71 It was the reputation of the Bank, 
accumulated over a century of prudence, which interacted with that of the state to make the actions 
                                                            
69 Our formal tests and discussion are restricted to the notion of weak stationarity, though of course broader defini-
tions which take into account the entire distribution also exist. 
70 We are here using the term paper money as intrinsically worthless money with positive market value. Other paper 
money systems remained partial and limited to peripheral regions (as in Scotland or North America) or eventually failed 
(as in medieval China or eighteenth-century France). However, Sweden’s Riksbank banknotes were inconvertible since 
1745, and had “by the middle of the eighteenth century, become and essential if not predominant component of the Swe-
dish monetary environment” (Roberds and Velde 2016). See also Quinn and Roberds (2014) for the case of the Dutch 
Republic. 
71 In France, paper money was only held as long as the Terror lasted: it was a guillotine-enforced system (Sargent 
and Velde 1995). This strongly contrasts with Britain’s experience, where “inconvertible paper money was grounded 
less in coercion … and more on … trust” (Shin 2015, p. 419). 
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and promises of both credible during the Restriction.72 
 
Our data from 1698 to 1821 suggests that the Bank never became an agency of the state, 
even in wartime.73  Over time the Bank build up a reputation for prudence. Thus when the con-
straint imposed by convertibility was removed the public could rely on the Directors of this pri-
vate corporation whose shareholders would expect them to maximize profits to maintain the 
established, prudential and traditional rules and conventions for both loans to the state and dis-
counts for its clients. At the time the Directors and Ministers, made this very point when con-
fronting attacks that the Bank was "forcing" notes into circulation. They were correct.  
 
Wartime military pressures also mattered, and interacted with the reputation of the Bank 
and the state. The extraordinary danger that the external war against France and its allies rep-
resented called for, and allowed, much bolder monetary policy experiments than would otherwise 
have been possible to implement.74 They would not have been possible in “normal” times in Brit-
ain (including at previous times of warfare), but they were also not possible in continental coun-
tries where institutions of comparable reputation to the Bank of England did not exist. At the 
beginning of these unusually serious wars, for practical purposes it may have seemed impossible for 
people in Britain to estimate the probability of future outcomes, such as winning the war or being 
invaded.75 Well-informed contemporaneous observers knew well that the outcome of the war was far 
from certain (Knight 2013). The pessimist’s view of Britain’s chances of prevailing was suggested by 
the political cartoonist James Gillray when he depicted French alarmists urging John Bull, represent-
ing the English public, not to accept paper money; the suggested reasoning was that once the French 
landed, Bank of England notes would surely be worthless. But he had to concede that the public ac-
cepted it.76 
 
Despite the seriousness of the military threats, and the unprecedented injection of liquidity in 
                                                            
72 This trust was reflected in the declaration movement whereby mostly merchants, but also people such as “farmers, 
grocers, inn-holders, butchers, bakers” (Shin 2015, p. 430) signed regional declarations, publicly promising to accept 
and keep using banknotes for payment. In the case of the London declaration, there were signatures by many “drap-
ers … warehousemen … haberdashers … stationers … sugar refiners … brewers … ironmongers” (Shin 2015, p. 
431). The declarations were targeted at a wide audience, and specifically, the lower classes Shin (2015, p. 429). 
73 Nevertheless, as we documented, the Bank did provide high levels of support to the Government during the Re-
striction Period. 
74 Bordo and Kydland (1995) interpret the gold standard as a contingent rule, in the sense that temporary suspen-
sion was possible during an emergency, such as a war, but it would be expected that once that emergency was over, 
convertibility would be restored at the original parity. But repeated suspensions would not be credible, especially if 
lasting for a long period. 
75 In economics this is known as a situation of ambiguity or Knightian uncertainty. 
76 See, in our appendix, Figure A4. 
  34 
the economy which we have documented here, no major panic ensued, and inflation remained moder-
ate when compared both with that in other countries at the time, and with the next war-time suspen-
sion, World War I. As the evidence we discussed in this paper suggests, the British public accepted 
the Bank’s fiat – essentially debt repackaged as money – at a moderate discount, certainly by conti-
nental standards.77 While some inflation did occur, possibly in part as a consequence of the very ag-
gressive monetary policy pursued by the Bank, Britain won the war and, importantly, by the time 
normal conditions returned the credibility of the Bank had not been compromised. By showing a 
willingness to be pragmatic during unusual times, the government and the bank may have in fact 
reinforced the public’s confidence in the financial system.78 We have here emphasized that in order 
for this to be possible, the government's credible commitment was not enough. In order for Britain to 
withstand the test of the revolutionary and Napoleonic war, the Bank of England’s patiently built up 
money management was also required. 
 
Which factors interacted with the Bank of England’s initial reputation to make the policy a 
success? Three reasons stand out. First, the Bank of England’s expansion of banknotes during the 
restriction was of a much smaller magnitude than had been the case in France a few years before. In 
1797, the ratio of Bank of England notes over nominal GDP was just under 23%, and in the next few 
years issues were never such that the 20% percent mark was crossed again, a target made easier by 
the economic growth performance of the British economy during those years (Bank of England 1967, 
Broadberry et al 2015). This strongly contrasts with the case of France during the assignats debacle, 
where the expansion of fiat was eventually exponential (Sargent and Velde 1995). In contrast with 
France, the Bank of England’s policies were subject to a series of checks and balances, being closely 
monitored, as exemplified by the “Bullion report”, and related controversies and debates (see for in-
stance Feavearyear 1931, pp. 190-2).79 Second, not only did Britain’s already have a comparatively 
high level of fiscal capacity, being able to credibly borrow80, but the policies of the Bank were also at 
this time accompanied by a series of fiscal reforms. An example was the introduction of an income tax 
                                                            
77 This is not to say that the Restriction Period transition was immediately accepted by everyone (Shin 2015). But 
while the discount could be up to 50% (though usually less), it must also be recognized that “In the ordi-
nary occurrences of life, and in small transactions … [notes and coin] might serve as well as the other" (The Times 
1811). It was only for large-scale transactions that a discount took place. 
78 The Restriction period permitted the ongoing solvency of the Bank of England (Chadha and Newby 2013), with 
implications for the financial stability of the country as a whole. 
79 There is a debate on whether the Bank discounted too liberally in 1808-9 (especially to the commercial sector, 
rather than the government); see for instance Duffy (1982).  It is nonetheless not clear that the 1810 financial crisis 
and inflation was due to too many banknotes in circulation. It may even have been that the “very issue of [the Bul-
lion] Report, followed as it was almost at once by the failure of several ‘several houses of first respectability’, had 
made bankers tighten the purse strings and had forced still more borrowers on to the Bank” (Clapham 2008b, p. 29).  
80 Sussman and Yafeh (2006) illustrate the long process of rendering public finances credible before the French 
Wars. 
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in 1798, which complemented the monetary reforms and allowed for the sustainability of the gov-
ernment’s budget constraint, while ruling out hyperinflation.81 Finally, the policy was promised (and 
believed) to be a temporary, wartime measure. 
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APPENDIX (for online publication only) 
Upon publication the data used in this paper will be made available at: 
https://sites.google.com/site/npgpalma/research 
Construction of the warfare intensity variable 
Our proxy for warfare intensity is the number of casualties (dead or wounded, plus missing or 
captured soldiers) per capita, that is, relative to the population of Britain during that year. The 
source for the casualties is the latest (third) edition of Clodfelter (2008). We have built a new 
dataset for Britain which partly relies on, but also improves on, that of Dincecco and Prado 
(2012) in several ways. First, while they present country averages, our data is of a higher (yearly) 
frequency, which allows for time series analysis, albeit at the loss of a comparative dimension; 
second, while they only consider external conflicts for 1700-88 we consider the 1694-1699 and 
1789-1815 periods as well; third, we include internal conflicts (such as the Jacobite risings of 
1715 and 1745); finally, our measure is set in not only absolute (in the main text) but also in per 
capita terms (in this appendix) as it is worthwhile to check that the results do not change when 
measuring conflict intensity in this time-comparable way. 
An alternative measure would use total men mobilized. This has several disadvantages, however, 
when compared with our measure of “hot” war.  First, unlike in the case of battle casualties, this 
data is much more often unavailable. Second, it is a more direct measure of present fiscal capaci-
ty, hence leading to confounding problems (countries with a larger population but weaker states 
have more difficulty recruiting and paying armies.) Finally, note that if a strong state is able to 
credibly threaten the formation of an efficient army this will scare enemies into strategically ac-
cepting conditions even without any causalities or even any mobilization at all.  
We included casualties for all the major (as defined in Clodfelter) land, coastal and sea battles, as 
well as sieges. Only British men were considered: hence Hessians for instance, were not, even 
though they were contracted by the British government. As with Dincecco and Prado, our defini-
tion of casualties includes captured, wounded and missing soldiers, as well as those dead of dis-
eases, which in the tropics could easily outnumber battle casualties. Unfortunately it is not possi-
ble to build an alternative measure which excludes these since Clodfelter often gives the joint 
number only. When a battle crossed over from a year to the next casualties were classified in the 
year which covers the majority of the time. If the battle spanned over more than two years, 
which was very rare and obviously only possible for sieges, we simply took the average. For sev-
eral battles, Clodfelter gives the overall figure for Britain’s side (e.g. the Allies during the war of 
  44 
the Spanish Succession) but does not break down the casualties of Britain, though often this is 
done. Indeed at times Clodfelter explicitly says the casualty numbers for Britain’s side are una-
vailable. For the benchmark estimate for this variable we have taken the conservative choice and 
assumed Britain’s casualties were proportional to those of its allies in that particular battle. So 
for instance, if Britain had two allies in that war, its casualty distribution toll was simply as-
sumed to be one third. Though a helpful first estimate, this is likely to suffer from the following 
biases. First, if because of superior fiscal capacity Britain was putting in a larger share of soldiers 
for its alliances then it is not surprising that casualties would be superior as well, which suggests 
an underestimate of Britain’s war effort; second, a possible offsetting factor is that the benchmark 
estimate is not scaled by country population size or the location of the war (it is natural that it 
would be easier to mobilize an army of the same size for countries physically closer to the actual 
battle). In order to control for both these factors, we build an alternative measure to which we 
apply an average war effort figure based on those cases for which we do know Britain’s contribu-
tion exactly, as spelled out in the following table. In summary, when the number of British casu-
alties for a given battle is known, we simply used that number. When a British ally entered a 
battle but Britain did not, we counted zero casualties for Britain.  
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Figure A1. The Old Lady of Threadneedle Street in Danger, by James Gillray. Published at Hannah 
Humphrey’s print shop on St. James Street, London, May 27th, 1797. 
 
 
Figure A2. Real military spending in per capita terms and war. Sources: For naval and military spending, 
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Figure A3. Government size and war (unit: Index, 1700=100). Source: Broadberry et al (2015) 
 
 
Figure A4. John Bull accepts paper money despite the warnings of French alarmists, by James Gillray. 
Published at Hannah Humphrey’s print shop on St. James Street, London, March 1st, 1797.  
 
 
